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1 Introduction
This is the second in a series of reports on the
current wave of youth civic engagement in Egypt.
Our goal is to offer an on-the-ground account of the
unfolding political changes in Egypt from the
perspective a small group of youths. Individual
young people were selected by the second author in
the first of his recurring visits to Egypt beginning
one week after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak on
February 11, 2011. Local contacts recommended in-
dividual youth to be interviewed, who then provided
further introductions. Through this “snowball” proce-
dure, the final group of youth (ranging from 8-12
depending on availability at the time of subsequent
interviews) was selected strategically to include
much of the apparent diversity among Egyptian
youth, while at the same time being small enough to
permit in-depth, repeated interviews with them over
the unfolding course of the revolution. Specifically,
the group (all in their 20s) included males and
female Muslims and Christians from Cairo and
Alexandria who were involved to varying degrees in
the revolution—ranging from never being involved in
demonstrations to constant participation (e.g.,
through sitting in Tahrir Square night and day
during critical periods). They have been interviewed
individually in English at approximately 4 month
intervals since the initial contact in early 2011.
Our first report was based on the portion of the
interviews in which the youths described their
involvement in the demonstrations of early 2011
that led to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. We
viewed their comments in terms of a social-
movement approach to civic engagement. These
young people spelled out their grievances against
Mubarak’s government, the ideological outlook they
shared on political reform, the opportunities that
enabled their actions, and the organizational appa-
ratus that made this momentous event possible
(Barber & Youniss 2012).
This article is a reflective analysis of questions
that have emerged in our enfolding research. We
continued to interview these same youth over the
past year and situated their evolving views first with
our further exploration of Egypt’s complex political
situation and second with our knowledge of recent
social scientific thought regarding civic engagement
among youth. This triangulation leads us to consider
three kinds of questions: 1) how to assess civic
engagement adequately in a population of youth that
lived under politically restrictive conditions; 2) how
new definitions of active Egyptian citizenship are
emerging; and 3) what these new definitions imply
for engagement in the future.
2 Assessing Civic Engagement
The events of early 2011 caught the attention of
scholars worldwide who study youth civic engage-
ment. For the past decade, the bulk of research was
focused on four issues: 1) the lack of engagement of
young people in established democratic states; 2)
the tendency of youth engagement to involve predo-
minately members of higher social-economic com-
munities; 3) the possibility that enmeshment of
youth in social networking activity may detract from
political engagement; and 4) attraction of youth to
armed conflict and political violence in weak or failed
states (Milner 2010; Goldstone 2011).
The initiatives taken by youth in Egypt fit none of
these categories. They resemble more closely youth
action during the 1950-60s civil rights movement in
the United States, the 1960-70s anti-war and anti-
nuclear movements in various European nations, and
the series of uprisings and revolutions on behalf of
democratic reform of authoritarian regimes that
occurred in the former Soviet Bloc in the 1980s and
1990s (Collin 2007). Regrettably, those instances of
revolution passed without much global attention and
little scholarly study (with the exception of East
Germany; Oberschall 2007; Opp & Gern 1993) and
thus there is little from those key events to guide us.
The movement was unanticipated, even in Egypt.
A survey of 15,000 Egyptian youth conducted by the
Population Council in 2009 and first reported on in
December 2010 assessed engagement in terms of
self-reported voting, internet use, volunteering,
degree of trust, and attitudes toward the govern-
ment. The authors offered the following conclusion:
friends and family… They do not invest time to learn
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“Civic engagement in young people in Egypt is very
weak … Their social networks are limited to few
more about the social and political issues from
available media, in print, or online” (Population
Council 2010, 147).
Only one month after the study’s publication, on
January 25, these characterizations proved to be
misleading as hundreds of thousands of young
people took public action at considerable risk, de-
manding the end to an oligarchic regime and the
beginning of a new democratic state. The size of the
demonstrations and the ability to sustain them in
the face of counter-movements by the government
required extensive organization and coordination
among various networks and interest groups. These
overlapping networks functioned together via co-
mmunication linkages provided through the Inter-
net. Thus, one month after findings of the 2009
survey were published, most of the elements in the
report’s conclusion were contradicted.
We do not fault the conduct of the survey for this
misreading of the population. Rather, the problem
more likely lies with the nature of and assumptions
behind such surveys. Items such as voting and fo-
llowing current political news are standard in
surveys of youth in Western societies that have esta-
blished democracies in which voters are recruited
and the media are unfettered from government
control. This leads us to ask whether these items are
useful for estimating the political orientation of
societies with oppressive regimes, such as Egypt
under Mubarak. For example, what value did voting
have if results of elections were preordained? And
why would young people follow news controlled and
knowingly censored by the state?
A more telling criticism pertains to the
assumptions that underlie this kind of survey.
Behind any survey are assumptions about the
conditions that would lead to the behaviors being
measured. If the behavior in question is voting, then
assumptions might be that everyone in the sample
has an equal opportunity to vote and that each vote
is meaningful to future political decisions and
policy. If these assumptions are incorrect, then it is
not reasonable to conclude that failure to vote
signifies disinterest in or neglect of civic duty.
This is not an esoteric point but highlights the
importance of decisions about measurement when
assessing civic engagement. In the United States, for
example, it is common practice to survey youth and
use the findings to characterize behavioral and
attitudinal tendencies of cohorts. One might call this
“generation labeling” as youth born between certain
dates are given names, such as GenX or Millennials,
and then assigned proclivities such as “consumer
oriented,” “self-centered,” “highly moral,” “generous,”
and the like. These attributions are nearly worthless
unless one knows the context and resources that
might have led to the behaviors and attitudes being
measured. For instance, affluent young people in the
United States are bombarded with targeted com-
mercial advertising that encourages them to be
heavy consumers of material goods. It would truly
be news if young people therefore were not
consumer oriented.
A positive example of a survey of Egyptian youth
that took account of resource availability and oppor-
tunity was also reported in 2010. The e4e (Education
for Employment, 2010) survey sampled 1,500 youth
and 1,500 employers including public and private
educators, policy makers, and civil society leaders.
The aim of the survey was to assess job and
educational aspirations of young people in corre-
lation with the educational and employment
conditions in which they were living. By design, this
survey sought to connect behaviors and attitudes of
youth with the resources available to them. There
would be little value if youth said they aspired to
become physicians yet they had no opportunity for
medical education, or to become computer pro-
grammers if they had no access to computers. It
follows that there is value in the decision to assess
youth attitudes alongside available education and
employment opportunities.
The conclusions from this survey were quite
explicable and realistic. The relative scarcity of youth
with technical skills was not attributed to youth’s
indolence or preferences but to the outdated
curriculum used in their schools. These data came
from youth and employers; the latter noting that they
have had to construct on-the-job internships to
compensate for the lack of skills even among college
graduates. It follows that youth are capable of acqui-
ring such skills but that they are not typically
provided with them by schools using antiquated
curriculums.
This point is made well by Queen Rania of Jordan
who sponsored the e4e survey. She argued that the
way to predict the future is to shape it through
education. Instead of attributing qualities to youth as
though there were no context, she recommends that
youth be educated for the qualities that are needed
in the contemporary job market. She claims, “We are
letting [youth] down in ill-equipped classrooms with
untrained teachers ... with outmoded curriculums
already obsolete in the modern marketplace.” She
then adds, importantly, “If I have learned one thing
over the years, it is this: we can trust youth to
maximize opportunities when they are presented”
(Education for Employment 2010, 7). In other words,
when youth are given educational opportunities, they
typically respond by capitalizing on them. And,
therefore, to assess their capacities more effectively
one should consider the resources they are provided
in education to succeed.
Another positive example that reinforces this
point are the findings of analysis of youth’s role in
ending the Mubarak regime reported by Gerhart
Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at the
American University in Cairo (Gerhart Center 2011).
They began by mapping assets that enabled youth to
become politically engaged. Instead of assigning
attributes to youth in the abstract, the authors
sought to connect behavior to the available
resources. For example, in trying to understand how
large, orderly crowds turned out and then were
sustained, the report described youth organizations
whose pre-Tahrir activities helped young people
become critically aware of the circumstances that
repressed their political potential and educated them
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3 A New Kind of Citizenship
The assessment of civic engagement also depends
on assumptions about what a good citizen within a
democracy is and how he or she should act.
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) have shown that
definitions of democratic citizens range from voting
and obeying the law to working actively for equality
and justice. Within democracies, there is legitimacy
in these and other forms of citizenship.
Given the political events that have occurred in
Egypt since 2011, it seems reasonable to ask
whether people have begun to reflect on a contrast
between the kinds of citizenship that fit the past and
emerging concepts appropriate for the future.
Although the future remains uncertain, no Egyptian
can escape discussion about democratic reform,
parliamentary elections, justice for killings and
arrests, numerous decisions by SCAF, the role of
Islam—the Muslim Brotherhood and the more rigidly
conservative Salafist Al-Nour Party—and the writing
of a new Constitution. It would be unusual if the
broad public airing of these issues did not provoke
Egyptians to consider seriously the kind of state they
want and their relationships to it and to their fellow
citizens.
Signs of change were already evident in the
demonstrations that involved various citizen groups
that previously might not have publicly interacted.
Individuals from various social sectors and organized
groups took part in large rallies to form a self-
organizing whole. Individual but connected groups
formed to take charge of communication, safety,
sanitation, mediation of disputes, and so forth. In
the process, generational, geographical, social, and
economic boundaries were bridged through collec-
tive, collaborative action. Outside the context of the
massive demonstrations, for example in cafes and
during small social events, individuals began to
speak openly about political views rather than
keeping them private or restricting them to family
and close friends.
Recent scholarship on citizenship may be helpful
for understanding the direction in which Egyptians’
concepts of citizenship could be headed. As noted in
the Gerhart Center’s 2011 report and Shehata’s and
El Mahdi’s documentation, many young Egyptians
already had experience operating in civil society
organizations and networks that extend well-beyond
family and close friends. They acquired experiences
of acting collectively without top-down management
in dealing with creative media, entrepreneurship,
volunteerism, and human rights organizing and
education. Abu-Lughod documented impressive self-
organizing capacities among youth in Upper Egypt
prior to and during the early months of the
revolution (Abu-Lughod 2012).
These activities may be understood in terms of
Elinor Ostrom’s “self-organizing and self-governing
forms of collective action” (Ostrom, 2009). Her Nobel
Prize winning work has shown that people around
the globe have the capacity for managing their
affairs productively without intervention from
government or other formal institutions. She has
in the importance of their own civic engagement. A
case in point was the non-government organization,
For You My Country that offered community-level
training for entrepreneurs and young people wanting
to create their own NGOs. FYMY was established in
2002 and has a staff of 50 persons. Its founding
principle was to teach youth that charity to the poor
will momentarily eliminate deprivation, “…but that
sustained civic engagement and strategic social
development …” have the potential to eradicate
poverty (Gerhart Center 2011, 17).
In addition to the substantial experiences young
political activists had over the years in organizing for
political change (El Mahdi 2009), the above examples
reveal that an enabling basis for the demonstrations
in early 2011 was laid down by programs that gave
youth experience in taking active steps to change the
society around them. Shehata (2008) has provided a
complementary analysis of organizing experiences
and sensed that a decade of activism, spurred by the
second Intifada in 2000, might bring about a new
mobilization of Egyptian youth. This prospect was
based on several factors. The decade of activism
took place outside existing political parties, was non-
ideological and inclusive of diverse outlooks, and
was supported by use of infor-mation technology
which broadened communication and allowed
efficient organization.
This last point was confirmed in a telling way by
Wael Ghonim, who documented the Internet cam-
paigns that were focused on Khaled Said, a young
Egyptian who was tortured and killed by the security
police in 2010. During the second half of that year,
the Internet was used to create networks of activists
who gained practical experience with public demon-
strations by participating in vigils to honor Said and
shame the Mubarak regime (Ghonim 2012). These
vigils provided youth with experiences of coordi-
nating communication among social networks as well
as with taking public stances against abuses by the
security police and risking the negative reper-
cussions.
To conclude on the first point, there are sophisti-
cated ways to assess the civic engagement potential
of Egyptian youth. They require that beha-viors and
attitudes not be viewed abstractly, but instead as
grounded in and coupled with the proper enabling or
impeding conditions. The assignment of attributes in
the absence of contextual conditions can be a
misleading exercise as was evident from the 2010
Population Council report. The youth depicted in that
survey had little in common with the youth of Tahrir,
the youth assessed in the e4e survey, the youth with
multiple NGO experiences, or the youth who
participated in Internet-instigated vigils des-cribed by
Ghonim. Once conditions in terms of opportunities
and resources are taken into account, a more
realistic portrait of youth’s potential for civic
engagement comes into clear view. If one wants to
estimate the political potential of Egyptian youth,
one first has to understand and measure the
resources and opportunities from which political
behavior could arise.
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studied ways in which individuals come together to
manage fisheries, forests, and other common
resources which might otherwise be exploited in the
classic “tragedy of the commons” scenario. Her major
finding is that pure market competition vs. govern-
ment management is only one way to model the
situation. She has documented a third possibility
that occurs when people choose to deliberate with
one another about sharing common resources for
mutual benefit and then create rules for managing
resources for mutual gain.
Peter Levine (Levine 2011) has built on Ostrom’s
work to argue that we should not be blinded by three
decades of political rhetoric that disjunctively pitted
government regulation against free market activity.
When limited to this either-or model, people become
either voters or consumers. Lost in the process is the
view that people can be “co-constructors of systems
of rules and norms” to guide their own affairs (Levine
2011, 9). He emphasizes that citizenship often
entails that people interact within networks,
deliberate about issues, and plan strategies of action,
both as individuals and as members of organizations.
The result is “politics on a human scale” with
emphasis on communication, trust, and collective
cooperation.
Danielle Allen (Allen 2004) offers another
perspective on this theme. She designates the 1954-
65 civil rights struggle in the United States as a
threshold event which altered understanding of
people-generated politics. As the civil rights
movement played out, forms of human relationships
sprung to public awareness so that people saw
themselves in different ways. They began to compre-
hend that benefits accruing at large to the middle
class white community were contingent on sacrifices
made by the African-American community. They
became aware of the segregated system and its
effects on reproducing a society of inequality, in turn
affecting the ways by which individuals, as members
of communities, were able to envision their own
acquisition of or limitation towards different means
and measures of success. Once this reciprocal rela-
tionship became apparent, a choice had to be made
either to continue in an asymmetrical fashion or to
acknowledge the possibility for a more sym-metrical
reciprocity. Selection of the former would result in
maintenance of racial segregation while choice of the
latter would lead to a “consensually based political
community” inclusive of everyone.
Along with Ostrom and Levine, Allen recognizes
that an inclusive form of democracy must be
continuously renewed. There is no pretense that all
people are alike or that literal equality can be
achieved. The goal, instead, is to keep striving for a
kind of wholeness guided by communication,
equitable treatment, and trust that others will reci-
procate.
At the time of writing, Egypt’s political future
remains uncertain. Will Egypt revert to oligarchy and
paternalism? Will Egypt become a religious state, a
secular democracy, or some mixture? We have no
answer, but in this brief discussion of citizenship we
will use interviews from young Egyptian activists to
suggest the relevance of this thinking to Egypt’s
current political evolution. As with civil rights in the
United States 50 years ago, in 2011 Egyptian
citizenship might have crossed a threshold which
closed the door to the past and opened the path to a
new future. At the very least, many Egyptians have
had opportunities to glimpse a new kind of polity in
which citizens can construct their political
relationships in a context within which government
ensures and encourages principled fairness.
Evidence that this new vision is emerging comes
from interviews with our sample of youth. We begin
with what they said about conditions before the
revolution. In February 2011, as the revolution was
unfolding, Omar, a human rights worker, noted that
the population was intimidated by being under
constant threat of arrest for public statements
against the government. An example he used was
that one could not have a harmless conversation in a
café without fearing that the stranger at a neigh-
boring table would later haul you into his office for
interrogation. Political conversations were under-
mined by what most of our sample described as a
culture of corruption in which people with power
exploited those with less power.
By July 2011, the youth in our sample noticed a
dramatic shift. Mohsen, also a human rights worker,
observed: “Now people are talking about military
courts. People are talking about civilians’ rights...
about the system, the regime. How we need to get
the judicial branch to be independent…People are
beginning to believe in principles that match their
values.” He added later: “Now if you have a point of
view and I dislike it, I will say, ‘OK, you are on the
opposite side of the revolution,’ and you will say the
same to me… We grew up in a system without a
chance to debate. We need to learn how to talk, how
to dialogue…We exchange opinions. We are like
children in the garden of democracy.”
Dina, a Christian human rights educator, made the
point about open discourse this way. “We are now
more aware…This is not the upper-middle class; ‘we’
is everyone. ‘We’ is the taxi driver. ‘We’ is everyone.
It is really impressive. Now when you sit in the taxi
and you pick up a conversation with the taxi driver
there is depth that wasn’t there before. And there’s
interest in what’s happening.” The same before and
after perspective was expressed by Kholoud:
“Whatever I [previously] thought I just kept to myself.
I use to think [about] what is right, but silently. Now I
am not silent anymore.” Omar, several months after
his initial expression of fear, described the change:
“We didn’t know before that we [could] do it. Now
we’re free; everyone can talk. Everyone can organize
themselves… Before you avoided people; you never
talked. But now I... go and talk.”
The same spirit of public discourse in which
potent ideas are exchanged was expressed as well in
November during the week of the long-awaited
elections. Mohsen said: “I was discussing [politics]
with a lot of people; I didn’t know one of them
before. We discussed the election, the candidates,
the process. It was the first time to have this kind of
conversation in a café... [Everyone in] the café was
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discussing these issues. People are ready [to listen].
They are flexible. If you use good arguments, you
could convince them.” He also recalled a conversation
with a taxi driver that grew into a vigorous debate
about the Emergency Law which essentially gave
security forces unrestrained power to arrest and
detain. Once Mohsen explained the manifest abuses
of the law, the taxi driver said, “I don’t know all these
things you said. But now I’m against the emergency
law.” Aly stated succinctly: “People are free to speak
out. Before, they were not allowed to talk [about]
government oppression.”
For Aly, the entire political system was now open
to public debate: “How are we going to establish
institutions? What is the role of the state? The
relation between the state and the masses? The
social order?...We are fighting about an Islamic or
secular state; it is more important to ask how this
state is going to perform.” Mohsen, too, saw dis-
cussion about the system as a new possibility. He
recounted that an old man congratulated him and his
generation by saying that because of what they did
“we can have a conversation about the vote [instead
of being restricted] to talk about football.” Mohsen
added: “The next step is to start to talk about the
constitution… talking about if we need a presidential
system or a parliamentary system, how we choose
government, how we [ensure] laws…as we go
forward.”
In summary, activists that were interviewed said
that before the revolution they were “walking beside
the wall,” meaning that they cautiously watched what
they said as they warily traversed daily interactions
with strangers. This metaphor also means that by
staying near the wall, they were succumbing to the
government’s insistence that it alone decided politi-
cal and economic affairs. After the revolution, the
activists interviewed said they had moved into the
center where they actively participate in politics
instead of harboring views privately. In the center,
they were engaging with others. They felt they could
now take up “serious” matters and topics of “depth.”
Even strangers now felt free to express political
perspectives to one another. They are willing to listen
to arguments, to try to the change the minds of
others, and to change their own minds.
A new kind of relationship was emerging among
Egyptians. They trusted that by stepping away from
the wall, they would not risk detention by security
police, and instead participate in the re-making of
society. This shift to self-organizing interaction was
summarized by Kholoud: “[We] now feel secure.
People have changed. People were sleeping by one
another [during the demonstrations] and nothing bad
happened. [We did not need] police or the security
force. Nothing [bad] happened. [We experienced]
social solidarity. If you have a bottle of water, you
share it with everybody.” Clearly, the bottle of water
could represent an idea and “sharing” refers to
exchanging views in a spirit of political collaboration
with one’s fellow citizens.
4 Building a Democratic Polity
Within a democracy, civic engagement can involve
working to create and sustain institutions as well as
opposing and reforming structures. Media accounts
since Mubarak’s resignation have been focused on
opposition to the regime which held power for three
decades and to the culture of oppression that
fostered relationships of corruption and mistrust
among ordinary citizens. Many of these accounts
also portray an uncertain population waiting for
decision makers to determine its fate. But if our
sample of youths is to be believed, people are not
standing by idly. Rather, there are signs that some
engaged youth have turned from revolution to the
task of constructing a new people-driven democracy
to replace the former system. The point of this third
section of our paper is to describe the forms of
engagement that illustrate youth perspectives and
actions leading to this goal.
The interviews reveal a surprising level of realism
amongst highly idealistic youth. In July 2011,
Kholoud observed, “it’s not yet a post-revolution. It’s
still [an ongoing] revolution. There is no revolution
on a date [at an appointed time]. It’s not a matter of
days, or weeks, or a couple of months. It’s like the
French Revolution that went on for ten years…It’s
really still on the very start.” What do these youth
expect to unfold with time? According to Aly, “We
need the time to develop political parties. Please, we
need to build structures; [to develop] natural leaders
who [will rise] from their own districts.” He added,
“for new political parties, you need…years. We need
time to build structures.”
Mohsen reflected, “We started the revolutionary
process six months ago but the philosophy of the
regime is still there. It’s in the normal [Egyptian’s
mind]. We get it in school. It’s [in the] relation bet-
ween the people who are ruling us and [in us] as
citizens. It’s about how you deal with me…It’s about
the culture.” He continued, offering a glimpse of the
task ahead: “we have to work to make civic education
for people all over the country.” He then used the
metaphor of planting seeds in agriculture. “We plant
the land and then get a yield in two or three years…
If this process is successful the values will come from
the people. We need to educate people. Maybe it
takes years. I think it will succeed in the end.” Aly
offered comments similar to Mohsen’s: “Calling the
military council to step down will not help the cause.
Now we have to call for real change. How are we
going to establish institutions? How are these
institutions going to function?”
Not only do these activists see the situation in
realistic terms, but they see their generation’s
engagement as key to a democratic future. In this
regard, they view themselves as committed and
engaged citizens. Omar said, “we are about change
happening. We reached the minimum level… against
corruption, people who stole our shirts for thirty
years. We are building for the [future] the next youth
[who will follow us]. This is more difficult than
convincing the [older generation]… I don’t think
anyone is feeling satisfied, that we [can] now relax.”
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Aly added, “We have serious problems on different
levels that need to be transformed. Just giving some
‘pain killers’ wouldn’t work… I mean we are speaking
about revolutions so just take your time and work on.
Work on the issues; deepen your strategy. Allow
yourself to develop more tactics and to understand
the causes in a much better way.” Later he
elaborated, “The World Bank is telling us that we are
fine, that everything is perfect… It’s mathematics and
economics. But you have to deconstruct these [data]
and understand what they mean.”
Mohsen poetically suggested that, “We are like
children in the garden of democracy. We have a
whole society who are like children in the
garden…Children want to learn by doing. If you tell
them this electricity is harmful, they will burn their
finger by experiencing [it].” Elaborating on this, he
used his own future as an example, describing that
he would one day be a grandfather narrating stories
to his grandchildren: “I’ll tell them stories about me
and my generation. If we succeed in this revolution,
we would be like the first [founding] fathers of
society. Every society has its first fathers. They place
the first stone, take the first step to make a
democratic society.”
In reviewing the interviews from our sample, we
noted a frequent and explicit commitment on behalf
of the activists to their nation’s future. Instead of
viewing themselves as superiors leading the masses,
they saw their actions as a means to awaken a
democratic spirit within their fellow citizens. In Aly’s
words, “This revolution was horizontal, not top
down.” Nearly every individual in our sample exp-
ressed belonging to the social mass and, moreover,
believing their actions were contributing to Egypt’s
history and future. Dina expressed: “I think many of
us have nationalistic feelings. We are attached to this
country one way or another. But it has always been
frustrating to be attached to Egypt … We live in
different continents while living in the same city.
People lead very different lives. They come from very
different social backgrounds, social classes, econo-
mic classes.” But when people stood together against
the old regime, she described, “It was beautiful. It
just felt beautiful.”
Alluding to the bombing of a Coptic church which
stoked tension between religious groups to make a
similar point, Kholoud noted: “It was really tragic. I
was crying every day. But the people surprised me
again. I have faith in the people. Every time I feel [the
revolution] is coming to an end…something happens
that brings new energy.” In this case, Egyptians came
out to demonstrate in support of religious tolerance.
Describing the demonstration, Kholoud said: “It was
really hot, people were tired, but they continued to
sit in. When you think things are getting out of
control, something happens and then you know why
you invest [trust] in people. Not in political parties,
not anything other than the people.”
5 Conclusion
There is no standard or best way to assess civic
engagement among youth. Throughout this paper we
have tried to show different sides of young
Egyptians’ engagement. Our general thesis is that
engagement cannot be approached merely as an
abstract concept, but needs to be analyzed in
conjunction with both enabling and impeding socio-
political conditions. Using this framework, it is clear
that the demonstrations which led to President
Mubarak’s resignation opened new paths for social
and political action for Egyptians. When people
operated in a context of corruption and authoritarian
control, relationships between individuals were
marked by wariness and distrust. Individuals hid their
ideas from public scrutiny, keeping them private or
within a restricted circle of close friends and family.
The revolution enabled new forms of public
discourse, and as people began to express ideas
publicly, feelings of trust became formed even
between strangers and when disagreements were
likely.
In making these arguments, we have drawn
primarily from the youth of our sample who were
socially conscious and politically engaged prior to the
revolution, whether in human rights education or
reform-oriented civil society organizations, and who
participated actively in the demonstrations. Concen-
trating on such youth was important because they
are the ones likely to lead and train their peers
through the process of democratic political change.
Despite their prior engagement, each individual was
transformed by the power and efficacy of the
revolution. And, as illustrated above, their awareness
of the real hindrances, struggles, and actions to be
taken has matured.
The initial euphoria that came with Mubarak’s
resignation has become a more sober realization that
if the revolution is to succeed, public discourse must
be accompanied by civic education. Many have
become aware, painfully, that the ways of the old
regime are etched deeply into Egyptian society and
that it will take time for them to be replaced.
Nevertheless, the revolution has provided a sense of
individual and collective efficacy in no longer per-
mitting the young activists to be abused by leaders’
self-interest, corruption, and brutality. These youth
have faith that the population can move forward with
the help of strong institutions that replace those of
the previous generations. This is a powerful outlook
insofar as it leads to and sustains these young
people’s own engagement for the sake of a new
democratic Egypt.
Finally, we wish to present two observations from
a broader interpretation of the interviews we con-
ducted. First, it is essential to point out that there are
many voices among Egyptian youth. Our conver-
sations with youth, who, unlike those we have
described above are not political activists, both
support and complicate the interpretations offered
throughout this article. In terms of support, all youth
with whom we spoke were unequivocally in favor of
the revolution. For example, Sayed, a 27-year old
from the Giza suburb of Cairo, did not participate in
any demonstrations. Sharing the attachments of his
family he was sympathetic to some degree to
Mubarak. Despite this, he was thrilled by the success
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of the initial phase of the revolution and more so
than any of the other youth we interviewed elabo-
rately extolled the grand history of Egypt and the
various ways in which the regime had defiled that
cherished identity. He phrased the permanence of
the change Egyptians have undergone through the
revolution in the following way: “Nobody [can] come
to get our throne now.”
However, Sayed has been very unsatisfied with the
way political activism has preceded. Like many youth
who approached us in Tahrir Square just weeks after
Mubarak stepped down, Sayed feels that the
revolution is “killing Egypt.” He and generations of
his family work in the tourist industry and they have
felt the economic consequences of the revolution
severely. Beginning with our first interview with
Sayed in March 2011 and in every meeting there-
after, he expressed frustration: “So, what do you
need?” he asks, referring to the protesters in Tahrir.
“All Egyptian people now need to stop. We made our
revolution successful, it’s ok. We got our president in
a jail, it’s ok. His son is in a jail, it’s ok. His wife now
is very old . . . all the thieves people from the old
system, now [are] in a jail.” Sayed does not under-
estimate the value of mass protest at Tahrir. Indeed,
he continued his statement by saying that if the new
president were to resemble Mubarak, then “It’s back
to Tahrir!” But for him, “What do we need now? You
must work! If you love Egypt, you must work.”
Thus, while it seems clear that at a broader level
the revolution has facilitated an openness and trust
among Egyptians, it is also apparent that there are
real divisions that may complicate progress towards
that democratic goal. With specific regard to youth
and their commitment to change, Sayed’s narrative
reveals that there may also be substantial distrust
among youth regarding what kinds of changes
should be made and how quickly.
Our second point has to do with the volatility of
this first year of the revolution. Above, we inten-
tionally provided excerpts from the narratives of the
youth we have been studying to illustrate the paper’s
central points about civic engagement and citizen-
ship. We have come to know these youth well over
the past year and have no doubt that their
expressions of growth, maturity, commitment, and
patience are authentic. However, these inspiring and
promising comments on real change occur within
narratives that are otherwise replete with frustration
and disillusionment; and, it appears, this is increa-
singly true. In the most recent interviews in March
2012, each individual described him- or herself as
very depressed and tense.
We provide this sobering portrayal not only to be
true to the lived experience of these young people,
but to illustrate points made above about the
dependency of democratic change on enabling
conditions. Crucially, all of the activists indicated
that their depression was a function of their per-
ception that no real change in the fundamental
conditions has been achieved. This was born out in
the timelines of the first year of the revolution that
we had them draw during the most recent interview.
Invariably, those timelines can be described as
“tragic” (that is, with a systematically downward
slope).
On one hand, despite deeply disappointing
moments – ranging from the increasingly abusive
behavior by the military to criticisms by peers or
adults that call into question the youths’ motives –
these youth are still able to articulate commitment
to principles of citizenship and democracy. On the
other hand, we have to acknowledge the uncertainty
in the durability of these transformations. They
appear to be highly sensitive to fluctuating condi-
tions. Despite those ever-changing conditions, the
youth continue to demand respect, trust, and
inclusiveness as fundamental to their movement.
Perhaps one future indicator of their growth will
be the degree to which the young activists are able
to adapt to changing political structures. For
example, while lecturing Aly and his compatriots to
abandon the Tahrir protests after the November
events in Mohamed Mahmoud Street (during which
Aly was shot in the face), his cherished mentor, a
noted professor and political activist, advised them
to adapt to current realities. Anticipating the com-
pletion of the parliamentary elections that began
that very week, she told them that mass protests at
Tahrir would no longer be useful. Rather, they
should begin visiting – daily if needed – the offices
of the newly elected officials and demand their
action on behalf of meaningful reform (Barber
2011).
Egypt has moved forward in establishing new
political structures by electing a new parliament and
a new president. Given that virtually no youth are
among the new leadership, it remains important to
understand how youth will adapt their attitudes and
methods of engagement to align with prevailing
realities. Or, should the new structures continue to
violate the self-respect and dignity that Egyptians
reclaimed through the revolution, perhaps it will be
“Back to Tahrir!”
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